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PROTECTION OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS: A "BASIC"
FORMULA FOR DEBUGGING THE
SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that the computer possesses "inevitable
potential. . . in almost every field of human endeavor."' Indeed,
in the past 30 years, computers have played a dominant role in the
development of the American economy.2 The novelty and ad-
vanced technology of these machines, however, have given rise to a
variety of legal problems.' One of the major areas of concern is the
2 Schmidt, Legal Proprietary Interests in Computer Programs: The American Experi-
ence, 21 JuimErcs J. 345, 347 (1981). The term "computer," as used throughout this
Note, refers to a digital computer. In a digital computer, data is represented by digits, and
problems are solved by arithmetical calculations. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65
(1972). An analog computer, unlike its digital counterpart, utilizes electrical analogs to solve
a given problem by "drawing an analogy between the variables of the problem, and certain
electrical quantities." D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.01, at 2-5
(1982). One example of an analog device is the thermometer, which analogizes the height of
mercury to a specific temperature. See id. § 2.01, at 2-4.
The digital computer contains five main elements: the input unit, which enters the data
into the computer; the memory unit, which retains the data; the control unit, which guides
the computer pursuant to the stored data; the arithmetic unit, which implements the logical
process; and the output unit, which manifests the result of the previous operations. Note,
The Patentability of Computer Programs, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891, 891 n.2 (1963).
See Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright
Laws, 81 Hv. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (1968). Prior to 1950, various kinds of computers were
constructed, but each type proved to be either difficult to program or limited in its capabili-
ties. See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 1.02[2]. The modem stored-program computers, which
incorporated basic operations directly into the circuitry, became popular in the 1950's. See
id. § 1.02[3]. By the latter part of that decade, these machines were refined to be "smaller,
cheaper, faster .... more reliable, and thirty times as economical to operate." Id. Since
that time, computers have been used in a multitude of areas, see id. § 3.01, including airline
reservation systems, management information systems, manufacturing, weather forecasting,
mathematical simulation, patient monitoring systems, and hospital record maintenance, id.
§§ 3.02-.07; see Note, supra note 1, at 891 n.1. For extensive discussions of how computers
have been utilized in the legal system, see THE LAW OF CoMpurTs (G. Holmes & C. Norville
eds. 1971); THE UsE OF Copumr s IN LTIGATION (J. Young, M. Kris, & H. Trainor eds.
1979).
1 Schmidt, supra note 1, at 349. In addition to the problem of providing protection for
proprietary rights in computer programs, there are both substantive and procedural difficul-
ties inherent in the use of these programs. Id. at 347. The substantive areas of concern
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protection of proprietary rights in computer programs.4 In light of
the estimate that the total value of computer software in the
United States is "in the tens of billions of dollars" and steadily
increasing,5 it appears that an in-depth examination of this prob-
lem is merited.
Traditionally, a developer of computer software has sought to
protect his proprietary rights by recourse to the patent, copyright,
or trade secret laws." Appeal to each of these sources of protection,
however, has spawned difficulties which have evaded uniform reso-
lution. For instance, a major question concerning the patent and
copyright laws is whether a computer program is proper subject
matter for protection." In the trade secret realm, courts have been
burdened with the task of determining whether federal patent and
copyright laws preempt state laws governing trade secrets and, as
include computer crimes and torts, contract questions, and the effect computers have had
upon basic human rights. Id. Additionally, the characterization of computer software as ei-
ther tangible or intangible property has sparked controversy in the tax field. See Bigelow,
The Computer and the Ta, Collector, 30 EMORY L.J. 357, 358 (1981). In the procedural
realm, computers have impacted upon discovery, trial preparation, and trial procedure. See
generally D. BENDER, supra note 1, §§ 9.01-.02.
4 This Note examines patent, copyright, and trade secret protection of computer pro-
grams in order to emphasize that clear legislative action is needed to eliminate the confusion
existing in these fields. For other commentaries which focus upon the question of legal pro-
tection for computer programs, see Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patenta-
ble?, 68 COLUM. L. Rzv. 241 (1968); Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1274 (1964); Note, supra note 2; Note, Adequate Legal Protection for Com-
puter Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 369; Comment, The Protection of Property Rights in
Computer Software, 14 AKRON L. Rav. 85 (1980).
5 See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 345-46 & n.2. The growth of the computer industry in
general has been rapid. See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 1.03. In the 1950's, there were ap-
proximately 20 computers in the United States, with the value of computing equipment
estimated to be close to $820 million. Id. By 1975, the respective figures had climbed to
212,000 and $40.8 billion. Id.
6 Note, Protection of Computer Programs: Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 333, 334 (1974); see, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (patent
protection); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1007-08 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (copyright protection); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311
F. Supp. 910, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (protection under trade secret law).
7 See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
585 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro
Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69 (N.D. 11. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d
1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980).
9 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 472 (1974); Warrington As-
socs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Syss., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. M11. 1981); Avco Corp.
v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. RP. (CCH) 1 25,207, at 16,157 (M.D. Ala. Sept.
4, 1980), afl'd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 474 (11th Cir. 1982).
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fundamentally, whether particular subject matter constitutes a
,,secret."'
Clearly, the patent, copyright, and trade secret laws, as pres-
ently interpreted, have not been completely effective methods of
protecting proprietary rights in computer programs."' This Note
will examine the major cases and statutes which have contributed
to the inadequacies of each of these protective bodies of law. The
Note will conclude that because the current methods have failed to
provide sufficient protection for the software industry, separate
legislation designed specifically for the protection of computer pro-
grams should be enacted. To assist in this endeavor, the Note prof-
fers a statute which is intended to enable owners to secure full pro-
prietary protection for their computer programs. In order to
obtain such protection, the Note further suggests, a program owner
must be willing to employ more than one protective form. Finally,
the Note briefly demonstrates how these proposals effectuate the
basic policies underlying computer program protection.
PATENTABILITY
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to provide
authors and inventors with protection against plagiarism of their
work product.' 2 Pursuant to this authorization, section 101 of the
Patent Act declares that a patent may be obtained by anyone who
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, . . . subject to
. . . [certain] conditions and requirements . . . . " "Process," as
defined by the statute, is equivalent to art or method.14 The ques-
10 See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173,
1183-84 (D. Ariz. 1973); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229,
1234-35 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affl'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 See Comment, Computer Program Protection: The Need to Legislate a Solution, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 586, 589 (1969) ("there has been only limited success in obtaining effective
protection"); see also Note, supra note 6, at 343 ("programmer's only current recourse is to
treat the program as a trade secret").
12 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Section 8, clause 8 of article I provides that Congress
has the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries ... . " Id.; see P. ROSENFRG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS III-1 (2d ed. 1982).
13 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Since 1790, Congress has enumerated the categories of statu-
tory subject matter. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 12, § 6.01, at 6-2. It was not until the present
Act, however, that the word "process" appeared. Id. It is this "process" category of patenta-
ble subject matter that has caused the most difficulties in interpretation. Id. at 6-3.
14 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976). Section 100(b), in addition to defining the term "process,"
states that this class of statutory subject matter "includes a new use of a known process,
[Vol. 57:92
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tion as to whether computer software is embraced by this defini-
tion, however, has been left to judicial interpretation.
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of computer
program patentability in Gottschalk v. Benson."5 In Benson, the
patent applicants claimed a new method which, with the aid of a
programmed digital computer, allegedly converted binary-coded
decimal numerals into pure binary form.'8 Their claims, however,
were not limited to any specific technology, machinery, or end-use
of the method.17 The Court held that the applicants' programming
method was not a "process" within the meaning of the Patent Act
and was, therefore, unpatentable. 18 In so deciding, Justice Douglas
reasoned that the plaintiffs' "process" claim was overbroad in that
it "covered both known and unknown uses" of the conversion
method.'9 Additionally, the Court stated that the mathematical
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." Id.
15 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Prior to 1968, patent law principles apparently would have pre-
cluded patentability of computer programs. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, the "function of a machine" doctrine classified as un-
patentable any process which simply described the function of a particular machine. Id. at
196 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909);
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 554-57 (1898); Risdon Iron & Loco-
motive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1895); Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
252, 268 (1853). This doctrine enjoyed wide acceptance in a number of lower courts. See,
e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. Centrifugal Eng'g & Patents Corp., 83 F.2d 116, 119-20 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 554 (1936); Chisholm-Ryder Co. v. Buck, 65 F.2d 735, 736 (4th Cir.
1933); see also In re Gartner, 223 F.2d 502, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1955); In re Horvath, 211 F.2d
604, 607-08 (C.C.P.A. 1954); In re Ashbaugh, 173 F.2d 273, 274-75 (C.C.P.A. 1949); In re
Nichols, 171 F.2d 300, 302-03 (C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Middleton, 167 F.2d 1012, 1013-14
(C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Solakian, 155 F.2d 404, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1946); In re Mead, 127 F.2d
302, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1942); In re Wadman, 94 F.2d 993, 998 (C.C.P.A. 1938); In re Ernst, 71
F.2d 169, 171-72 (C.C.P.A. 1934). Additionally, under the "mental steps" doctrine, purely
mental operations did not constitute a patentable process. See In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188
F.2d 377, 380-81 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 556 (C.C.P.A. 1945). The
basis of this doctrine was the well-established rule that a scientific concept or mere idea is
unpatentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1933). The "mental steps" doctrine was used
primarily to prevent patentability of inventions involving mathematical computations. See,
e.g., In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d at 379-80; Bolongaro, 62 F.2d at 1060. In addition, this
doctrine was employed to deny patentability in cases where the only inventive element of
the patent claim was the mental computation. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.
v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821-23 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); In
re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (C.C.P.A. 1958); In re Lundberg, 197 F.2d 336, 339 (C.C.P.A.
1952); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168-70 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Cooper, 134 F.2d 630, 632
(C.C.P.A. 1943).
6 409 U.S. at 64.
27 Id.
"8 Id. at 71-72.
19 Id. at 68. The Court stated that the applicants' conversion method could be used for
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formula involved could only be applied in connection with a digital
computer.2 0 To permit the patent to issue, Justice Douglas con-
cluded, would thus be to patent the formula itself.21
The Benson Court noted that its decision did not preclude the
granting of a patent for any computer program.22 Four years later,
a variety of purposes, including train operation, license verification, and legal research. Id.
20 Id. at 71.
21 Id. at 71-72. Although the Benson Court did not expressly discuss the "mental steps"
doctrine, see supra note 15, at least one commentator has suggested that the holding in
Benson "compliments rather than conflicts" with that doctrine. Qomment, Computer Pro-
gram Classification: A Limitation on Program Patentability as a Process, 53 O& L. REv.
501, 518 n.132 (1974). It is interesting to note that the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals had rejected the "mental steps" doctrine, as applied to computer programs, 4 years
prior to Benson. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on rehear-
ing, 415 F.2d 1393, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1969); see also In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399
(C.C.P.A. 1969). Furthermore, in the modified Prater opinion, the court observed that it
knew of "[n]o reason... why. . . apparatus and process claims broad enough to encom-
pass the operation of a programmed general-purpose digital computer ... [would] necessa-
rily [be] unpatentable." 415 F.2d at 1403 n.29 (emphasis in original).
Notably, in 1968, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals expressly declined to follow
the cases applying the "function of a machine" doctrine. In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d
856, 866 (C.C.P.A. 1968); see supra note 15. This doctrine, together with the "mental steps"
doctrine, subsequently was replaced by principles that accounted for various developments
in computer technology. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
In re Bernhart, the court held that a computer "programmed in a... new and unobvious
way" is patentable subject matter. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969). One
year later, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was faced with a "process" claim in-
volving a computer program and decided that "a sequence of operational steps" is a patent-
able "process" if it is within the "technological arts." In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
1 409 U.S. at 72. The Court restricted the scope of its holding by stating.
We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the
requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision precludes a pat-
ent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold. It is said that we
... extend our holding to programs for analog computers. We have, however,
made clear from the start that we deal with a program only for digital computers.
Id. at 71. The first attempt by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to interpret Ben-
son took place in In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In Christensen, the
court held that a particular claim is unpatentable if its "point of novelty" is a mathematical
formula that must be solved as a condition to the method's effectiveness. Id. at 1394. But
see In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (declining to adopt the "point of nov-
elty" approach). The court, recognizing that the issue in Benson was distinguishable insofar
as it involved "process" and a computer program, nevertheless believed that Benson was
applicable to the claimed method. 478 F.2d at 1394. This broad construction of Benson,
however, was narrowed in a number of later cases. See In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148-49
(C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 156
(C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771
(C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976);
infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
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in Dann v. Johnston,23 the Court observed that the holding in
Benson was, indeed, "limited" to "process" claims.24 A similar atti-
tude was exhibited by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
In re Nol125 and In re Chatfield,26 notwithstanding dissenting ar-
guments that Benson prohibited patentability of all computer
software.27 In subsequent cases, it was consistently determined
that a program-related claim was unpatentable if, by granting the
patent, further use of the mathematical formula involved in the
program would be precluded.28
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of patentability
of computer software in Parker v. Flook,29 in which a patent appli-
cant claimed a new method for updating alarm limits during cata-
lytic conversion processes.30 The method involved three steps, only
one of which, the mathematical algorithm, caused the applicant's
invention to differ from conventional methods of updating alarm
limits. 3 1 The applicant contended that Benson was distinguishable
on the ground that there were useful "post-solution" applications
- 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
2, Id. at 224. In Johnston, a patent was sought for what the applicant described as a
"'machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank checks and deposits.'" Id. at 220.
The applicant sold his claimed invention in the form of a computer program. Id. The Court
found it unnecessary to address the issue of the general availability of patent protection for
such programs, concluding that the obviousness of the invention rendered it unpatentable.
Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See generally P. ROSENBERG, supra note 12, §§ 9.01-.05
(discussing the nonobviousness requirement for patentability).
25 545 F.2d 141, 148-49 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
2, 545 F.2d 152, 155-56 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
27 See In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d at 160-61 (Rich, J., dissenting); In re Noll, 545 F.2d
141, 151 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Lane, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
" See, e.g., In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1243-45 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Waldbaum,
559 F.2d 611, 616-17 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689, 692-93 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
21 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Prior to the Flook decision, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals developed a two-prong test to determine the patentability of program-related in-
ventions. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Under the Freeman
test, an initial determination is made as to whether the claim includes a mathematical al-
gorithm, followed by an analysis of the preemptive effect of the claim on that algorithm. See
id. If a particular claim served to preempt entirely the algorithms, then Benson would be
applied to deny patentability. See id.; see also In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817-19
(C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); In re Phillips, 608 F.2d 879, 882-83
(C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (applying Freeman).
3O 437 U.S. at 585.
31 Id. at 585-86. As the Court noted, an "alarm limit" is simply a number which indi-
cates the existence of an abnormal condition in the catalytic conversion process. Id. at 585.
For certain operations, the alarm limit may be fixed, whereas for others, it is essential that
the alarm limit be updated periodically. Id.
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of the formula involved in his method.2 The Court, speaking
through Justice Stevens, held that such applications did not
"transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. '33
Assuming the algorithm to be within the prior art,34 the Court
stated that the claim, taken as a whole, was unpatentable because
it "contain[ed] no patentable invention," not because a mathemat-
ical formula was an element of the applicant's method.3
Justice Stewart dissented,36 disputing the majority's interpre-
tation of Benson and arguing that a claimed method is not unpat-
entable merely because one of its components, standing alone, may
not be patented." Furthermore, the dissent asserted, the Court's
consideration of the inventiveness of the process was an improper
inquiry in determining subject-matter patentability.38 The ques-
tion of inventiveness, contended Justice Stewart, becomes signifi-
cant only after the subject matter is determined to be patentable.3 9
11 Id. at 589-90. The applicant argued that the claim did not "wholly preempt the
mathematical formula" because, although the claim covered many of the potential uses in
the petrochemical and oil-refining industries, it did not "cover every conceivable application
of:the formula." Id. at 586, 589-90.
" Id. at 590.
" Id. at 591-93. The Court observed that a mathematical formula must be considered
well known because the scientific principle expressed in the formula merely indicates a rela-
tionship previously in existence. Id. at 593 n.15; see P. ROSENBERG, supra note 12, § 1.04.
35 437 U.S. at 594. It has been suggested that the Flook holding is a return to the "point
of novelty" approach adopted by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Chris-
tensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.01[2], at 4A-
4; see also supra note 22. Notably, however, the "point of novelty" analysis has been re-
placed by the two-prong test developed in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A.
1978). See supra note 29. Indeed, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has stated that
Flook did not adopt a "point of novelty" test, arguing that "such a test flies in the fact [sic]
of Supreme Court precedent ...... "In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766-67 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
The precedent being referred to by the Walter court includes a number of cases that deal
with principles of science and mathematics, yet aid in the resolution of computer-related
issues. Id. at 765; see Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948);
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Tilghman v. Proc-
tor, 102 U.S. 707, 724-25, 728 (1880); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
498, 507 (1874); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 61, 101 (1853); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). It should be noted that the Freeman test officially has been
incorporated into the Patent and Trademark Office Guidelines that were promulgated in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, New M.P.E.P. Sec. 2110 Patentable Subject Matter-Mathe-
matical Algorithms or Computer Programs, reprinted in D. BENDER, supra note 1, App.
4A[2], at App. 4A-23.
'8 Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
" 437 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
39 Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that a particular claim's novelty is
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The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court in this
area was made in Diamond v. Diehr.'0 In that case, the patent ap-
plicants claimed a novel method for curing synthetic rubber that
involved an established mathematical formula41 and a programmed
digital computer.42 Unlike its decisions in Benson and Flook, the
Court, in Diehr, accepted the applicants' claim, reasoning that a
particular method should not be considered unpatentable merely
because a mathematical equation or programmed digital computer
is used. 3 The critical inquiry, stated the Court, is whether the ap-
plicant is attempting to patent an abstract formula or simply try-
ing to prevent others from using that equation "in conjunction
with all of the other steps in . . . [the] claimed process." 44 The
Court also noted that the "novelty" of the process itself or of its
steps is irrelevant to the determination of whether the subject
matter is patentable. 5
relevant only to the question of whether a patent will actually issue. Id. (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). The majority's decision to introduce this element when determining whether the
claim is patentable subject matter, the dissent opined, "strikes . . . a damaging blow at
basic principles of patent law. . . . "Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see In re Bergy, 596 F.2d
952, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("[a]n invention can be statutory subject matter and be 100% old,
devoid of any utility, or entirely obvious"), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980); see also Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 906 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 961 (1979).
40 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Prior to the decision in Diehr, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals expressed dissatisfaction with the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Flook.
See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-63 (C.C.P.A. 1979), af'd sub noma. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
"' The formula involved in the patent applicants' method was the Arrhenius equation.
450 U.S. at 177. This equation, named after its discoverer, was long used as a method of
calculating the cure time in rubber molding presses. Id. at 177 n.2.
42 Id. at 178. The patent applicants claimed that their method for curing synthetic rub-
ber was novel because it accurately measured the inside temperature of the press. Id. at 179.
The remainder of the method consisted of entering the temperature readings into a com-
puter which would, by means of a mathematical formula, eventually determine the proper
moment at which the press should be opened. Id. Prior to the development of this method,
overcuring or undercuring of the rubber was a common problem in the industry. See id. at
178 & n.3.
43 Id. at 187.
" Id. The Court concluded that the patent applicants' claims were not "an attempt to
patent a mathematical formula, but rather ... [were simply] drawn to an industrial process
for the molding of rubber products. . . . " Id. at 192-93.
45 Id. at 190. The Diehr Court stated that the "novelty" of the claimed method should
be considered only under section 102 of the Patent Act, the provision dealing with the con-
ditions for patentability. Id. at 190-91. This reasoning is in complete harmony with the leg-
islative history of the 1952 Patent Act. See id. at 190. The Senate Report clearly indicates
that "section 102 covers the conditions relating to novelty." S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2394, 2399. Moreover, the same re-
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Justice Stevens, who authored the Flook decision, dissented,4 6
offering three reasons for his rejection of the majority's view that
the claimant's method was "new. '41 First, the dissent stated that
the patent application itself lacked any indication of a unique
characteristic embodied in the temperature reading device.48 Sec-
ond, the dissent noted, such devices have been in existence for
years.49 Finally, Justice Stevens stressed that the only distinguish-
ing element of the device was its use of a mathematical formula
and a digital computer.50 Justice Stevens concluded that to grant a
patent under such circumstances "trivializes the holding in Flook,
the principle that underlies Benson, and the settled line of author-
ity reviewed in those opinions." 51
Clearly, Diehr illustrates the Supreme Court's current willing-
ness to sustain the patentability of program-related inventions. 52
Such willingness does not connote, however, that computer pro-
grams, as such, are patentable. 53 This lack of an ascertainable rule
port states that "[s]ection 102 . . . may be said to describe the statutory novelty required
for patentability, and includes, in effect, an amplification and definition of 'new' in section
101." Id. Thus, it is submitted that the Diehr Court's conclusion as to the "novelty" require-
ment is wholly within the spirit and letter of the Patent Act of 1952, and comports with the
Court's own mandate that the express language of the patent laws must be adhered to
strictly. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)); see In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-61
(C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nor. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Indeed, even
textwriters treat subject-matter patentability and "novelty" as two distinct areas of law.
See, e.g., A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 72-162, 230-476 (2d ed. 1964); G. RosE,
PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 18-40 (1978); P. ROSENBERG, supra note 12, §§ 6.01-7.14; Diamond
v. Diehr: The Patentability of Processes and Incorporated Algorithms, 8 OHio N.U.L. REv.
535, 539-40 (1981).
" Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
47 450 U.S at 207-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens sardonically remarked
that the "question [whether a rubber-curing process is patentable] was effectively answered
many years ago when Charles Goodyear obtained his patent on the vulcanization process."
Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In fact, the dissent posited, the
claimed method is similar to the method which was at issue in the Flook case. Id. at 207
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 207-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 208-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that section 101 precludes
the patentability of a program-related invention provided that the use of the computer con-
stitutes the requisite contribution to the art. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 Cf. Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J.
484, 492 (1981) (Diehr clarifies that patent protection is available for the underlying
processes of computer programs, as long as the process is something more than a mere
mathematical formula).
"1 The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether computer programs
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presents an obstacle for the patent lawyer who is trying to deter-
mine whether a particular invention incorporating a computer pro-
gram will be patentable. 4 Indeed, several commentators believe
that as a result of Diehr, the success of a patent application involv-
ing a computer program is likely to hinge upon skillful claim-draft-
ing. 56 More significantly, however, it appears that reliable patent
protection currently is not available for the developers, financers,
and investors involved in the creation of a computer program."
themselves are patentable. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981) ("determin[ing]
whether a process ... which includes . . . the use of a mathematical formula and a
programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101"); Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (ascertaining "whether the identification of a limited cate-
gory of ... post-solution applications of... a formula makes... [a] method eligible for
patent protection"); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976) ("no need to treat" the
question whether computer programs are patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64
(1972) (determining "whether the method described and claimed is a 'process' within the
meaning of the Patent Act" (footnote omitted)). Historically, a "process" was considered
patentable subject matter notwithstanding that it was not statutorily protected until 1952.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981). In Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876), the
Supreme Court described a patentable process in the following manner.
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the
instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed.... A process is a mode of treatment
of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different
state or thing .... In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery
pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patenta-
ble; whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new
result. The process requires that certain things should be done with certain sub-
stances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of
secondary consequence.
Id. at 787-88. It is submitted that in order to provide protection for computer programs
themselves, they must be defined as clearly as the Cochrane Court defined the nature of a
patentable process. Until this is done, it appears that the lack of adequate protection for
computer programs will continue.
' See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 See, e.g., Freed, Patent Developments: The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 92 F.R.D. 192, 195 (1981); Com-
ment, Diamond v. Diehr, 50 U. CiN. L. REv. 645, 661-62 (1981) (suggesting that if the Diehr
claim had been drafted differently, the C.C.P.A. might have denied the patent).
" See Note, Process Patents for Computer Programs, 56 CALIF. L. Rav. 466, 490-92
(1968); Comment, supra note 11, at 589-90; Comment, supra note 21, at 511-12. In address-
ing the adequacy of patent protection for computer programs, it should be noted that some
commentators question whether computer programs should be patented at all. See, e.g.,
Bender, supra note 4, at 250-52. The primary argument asserted is that the Patent Office
cannot adequately examine program claims because there are no effective methods of classi-
fication. See id. at 250 n.47 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE PREsmENr's COMMISSION ON THE
PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF. . . UsEFuL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLOD-
ING TECHNOLOGY 13 (1966)). Moreover, it is contended that even if such methods did exist,
the administrative burdens placed upon the Patent Office would be overwhelming. See
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:92
COPYRIGHTABILITY
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) states
that copyright protection extends to "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression. '57 The legislative his-
tory of the Act clearly indicates that computer programs, in their
written form, are included within the protected subject matter. 8
There has been some dispute, however, as to the copyrightability
of a computer program in its "object" stage, where the program is
embodied in a mechanical device such as the Read Only Memory
(ROM) silicon chip.5 9 Although much of the confusion in this area
Bender, supra note 4, at 251 & n.50; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Comment, The Subject Matter Analysis for Computer-Related
Processes: A Matter of Characterization, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1140, 1164-65 (1981). But see
Note, supra note 1, at 914 ("[i]t is theoretically and practically possible to secure effective
patent protection for computer programs"). For a criticism of the arguments raised against
the patentability of computer programs, see Bender, supra note 4, at 250-52. At least one
commentator has suggested that the question whether computer programs should be pro-
tected may be "academic" because the rapid technological advancement of the software in-
dustry might render programs obsolete. Note, Adequate Legal Protection for Computer
Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 369, 370.
11 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. III 1979). Section 102(a) specifies a number of categories of
protected subject matter. See id. These categories include sound recordings, motion pic-
tures, pantomines, and literary, dramatic, and choreographic works. Id. Also protected by
section 102(a) are musical, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Id. The subject matter
eligible for copyright protection, however, is not unlimited. See id. § 102(b). Section 102(b)
provides that copyright protection does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the [particular] form" of
the work. Id. This section was enacted to clarify the rule that copyright protection extends
only to the expression of intellectual ideas, such as the writing, and not to the ideas them-
selves. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.],
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. The legislative history indicates
that in the area of computer programs, copyright protection extends to the particular ex-
pression used by the programmer. Id. The "actual processes or methods embodied in the
program" are not copyrightable. Id.
" See H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 57. Any lingering doubts as to the copyrightability
of computer programs, in their written form, should be dispelled by the recent addition of a
definition of computer program to section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1976), as amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028
(1980) (presently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980)); see also Tandy Corp. v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Data Cash Syss.,
Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980).
11 Compare Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173
(N.D. Cal. 1981) and Williams Elec. Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., No. 81-1852 (D.N.J. June 24,
1981) with In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1113 (N.D. Cal.
1980) and Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980). There are four stages in
the development of a computer program. See M. Pope & P. Pope, Protection of Proprietary
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can be traced to the 1908 Supreme Court decision of White-Smith
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,60 recent statutory amendments
of the federal copyright laws have done little to clarify the availa-
bility of copyright protection for computer programs in their "ob-
ject" stage.6 ' As a result, courts have experienced difficulty in de-
termining whether to grant protection to such a medium. 2
Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. Ray. 527, 530 (1979). The first stage, a "sche-
matic program," involves the development of a "flow chart" which graphically manifests a
problem-solving concept. See id.; see also Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F.
Supp. at 1065. A "source program" which translates the flow chart concept into program-
ming language (such as FORTRAN or ALGOL) is then developed. See M. Pope & P. Pope,
supra, at 530; see also 480 F. Supp. at 1065. Third, the "assembly program" is developed in
order to translate the source program into "mechanically readable computer language." 480
F. Supp. at 1065; M. Pope & P. Pope, supra, at 530-31. Finally, an "object program," which
converts the assembly program into a mechanical apparatus is constructed. 480 F. Supp. at
1065. The object program involved in the Tandy and Data Cash cases was a Read Only
Memory (ROM) silicon chip which, upon installation, became part of the computer's cir-
cuitry. See 524 F. Supp. at 173; 480 F. Supp. at 1066; see also Keplinger, Computer Intel-
lectual Property Claims: Computer Software and Data Base Protection, 177 WASH. U.L.Q.
461, 464 (a computer program is really "the mechanical embodiment of the [written] in-
structions themselves").
11 209 U.S. 1 (1908). The White-Smith decision, see infra text accompanying notes 63-
65, caused difficulties in the sound recording industry as well as the computer program in-
dustry. See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 367. Prior to the enactment of remedial statutory
measures, there was widespread record and tape "piracy." 1 M. Nn&,R, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 2.10[A], at 2-141 (1982); see Schmidt, supra note 1, at 367. The value of such unau-
thorized duplication was estimated to be in excess of $100 million annually. 1 M. NmmR,
supra, § 2.10[A], at 2-141. This tremendous loss to copyright owners prompted enactment of
the Sound Recording Amendment in 1971. Id.; see Act of Oct. 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 92-140,
85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (Supp. H1 1979)). This section
definitively provides that copyright protection extends to sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(7) (Supp. H 1979). Notably, however, a copyright owner's rights in a sound record-
ing are more restricted than those which may be asserted for other kinds of copyrightable
subject matter. See 2 M. NimMER, supra, § 8.05[A]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(a), (b) (Supp.
M 1979). A copyright nevertheless is infringed only if there is a "substantial similarity"
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's works, regardless of the form in which those
works appear. 2 M. NimmER, supra, § 8.05[A].
e See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
" Compare Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (computer program is copyrightable even if it is in the form of a mechani-
cal ROM chip) with Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67
n.4 (N.D. M11. 1979) (dictum that computer programs are copyrightable "in their flow-chart,
source and assembly phases but not in their object phase, i.e., the ROM .... "), aff'd on
other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980). It should be noted that the Copyright
Office began accepting computer programs for copyright in 1964. Schmidt, supra note 1, at
366. At that time, the Copyright Act of 1909 did not expressly cover computer programs.
See id. Computer programs thus were considered to be within the section of the statute
covering "'[b]ooks . . . and other compilations."' Id. (emphasis in original); see Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(a), 35 Stat. 1076 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (Supp.
]1 1979)). This interpretation was not unusual, however, in view of the broad construction
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In White-Smith, the Supreme Court encountered the question
of whether a copyright on sheet music was infringed by a perfo-
rated pianola roll which, when operated, reproduced the same mu-
sical sound as that represented on the sheet.6 3 The Court, speaking
through Justice Day, held that there was no copyright violation."'
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the pianola roll
was not a "copy" because it was not "in a form which others can
see and read."65 Although the legislative history of the 1976 Copy-
right Act indicates that the White-Smith rationale should be
avoided, 66 that case nonetheless continued to have an impact upon
traditionally given to the "writings" of an author. E.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
561-62 (1973) (sound recordings); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60-62 (1911) (mo-
tion pictures); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (photo-
graphs); Nelson, The Copyrightability of Computer Programs, 7 ARIz. L. REv. 204, 207
(1966); see Schmidt, supra note 1, at 366; Comment, Scope of Protection for Computer
Programs Under the Copyright Act, 14 DE PAuL L. REv. 360, 365 (1965).
11 209 U.S. at 8-9. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the defendant's alleged
infringement of the copyrights obtained by the plaintiff for two musical compositions pub-
lished in the form of sheet music. Id. at 8. Contending that the defendant's perforated pia-
nola roll was an infringement of such copyrights, the plaintiff theorized that copyright law is
designed to preclude the use of every means of reproducing the composer's particular music.
Id. at 11. The defendant, on the other hand, argued that copyright protection extended
merely to the physical results of the mental operations, namely, the sheet music represent-
ing the plaintiffs two musical compositions. Id. Addressing these opposing arguments, the
Court observed that "large property interests" would be affected by the decision rendered in
the case. Id. at 9. Indeed, one commentator has stated that "White-Smith reflected the
tension between the public interest in protecting the rights of sheet music publishers, on the
one hand, and the infant pianola industry, on the other." Schmidt, supra note 1, at 367.
" 209 U.S. at 18. Generally, in order for a plaintiff to establish his case in a copyright
infringement action, he must prove that he owned the copyright and that there was a "copy-
ing" by the defendant. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 60, § 13.01. A number of requirements,
including subject-matter suitability, originality, citizenship, and compliance with statutory
formalities, must be met before a plaintiff establishes ownership of the copyright. Id. §
13.01[A]. The copyright registration certificate facilitates the plaintiff's satisfaction of the
ownership requirement insofar as it constitutes prima facie evidence of copyright. See id.;
see also 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. III 1979). To prove that there has been a copying by the
defendant, the plaintiff usually must establish that the defendant had access to the copy-
righted work and that there was a substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and
the alleged duplication. 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 60, § 13.01[B]; e.g., Ferguson v. National
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v.
Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976).
6' 209 U.S. at 17. Based upon expert testimony given during the proceedings, the Court
defined a copy of a musical work as "'a written or printed record of it in intelligible nota-
tion.' " Id. Prior to its being reduced to written or printed form, the Court stated, a musical
composition is an idea existing in the mind of the composer. Id.
" See H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 52 (stating that the "broad language [of section
102(a)] is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from
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the copyrightability of computer programs . 7
Turning to the Act, prior to its revision in 1980,68 section 117
was a source of consternation for courts attempting to decipher its
meaning."9 That section provided in part:
Notwithstanding... sections 106 through 116 and 118, this
title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any
greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in con-
junction with [computers] ... than those afforded to works
under the law ... in effect on December 31, 1977. . . .7
The legislative history of the original section 117 plainly reveals
that Congress was concerned with a copyright owner's rights re-
specting "computer uses of copyrighted works," and not with the
copyrightability of programs themselves.71 Moreover, the introduc-
tory language of the original section 117 itself indicates that it was
not intended by the legislature to be a modification of section 102,
the subject matter provision of the Act. Nevertheless, a few lower
cases such as White-Smith"). Unlike the reasoning relied upon in White-Smith, the legisla-
tive history indicates that the forms, manner, or medium of fixation is irrelevant to the
determination whether particular subject matter is copyrightable. See id.
61 See infra text accompanying notes 74-78. The rule derived from the White-Smith
case, see supra text accompanying note 65, is still controlling "for many pre-1978 works,
including computer programs." Schmidt, supra note 1, at 367. One commentator even has
expressed the opinion that the White-Smith rationale should continue to apply. See Prasi-
nos, Worldwide Protection of Computer Programs by Copyright, 4 RuT. J. CoMPUTEM & L.
42, 47 (1974).
" Section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act, in its original form, was intended to maintain
the status quo in the area of computer program copyrightability until further investigation
of the issue could be made. See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 369. The effect of the section,
however, has been to require that courts consider the question whether computer programs
may be copyrighted. Id.
4" See infra text accompanying notes 74-87.
70 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. M 1979), amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (presently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980)); see
infra note 91.
71 See H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 116. As gleaned from the legislative history, Con-
gress intended that copyrightability of computer programs themselves would be governed by
the 1976 Copyright Act. See id.
72 See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. 1I 1979), amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (presently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980)).
The legislative history of section 117 makes clear that such provision dealt only with the
"exclusive . . .bundle of rights" possessed by a copyright owner under section 106 and
limited under sections 107 through 116 and 118. See HR. REP., supra note 57, at 116.
The "bundle of rights" which may be possessed by a copyright owner includes the
rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance and display. See 17 U.S.C. §
106(1)-(5) (Supp. HI 1979); 2 M. NImaR, supra note 60, §§ 8.02, 8.09, 8.11, 8.14, 8.20.
Whether copyright protection is obtained by registering a work which is not published, or
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federal courts have had differing views as to the effect of the origi-
nal section 117 upon the copyrightability of computer programs in
their "object" stage.73
In Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 4 for exam-
ple, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, copyright infringement of a
program developed for the plaintiff's computer chess game.75 The
program was in the form of a silicon chip installed in the com-
puter's circuitry.76 The court, using the White-Smith rationale,
concluded that any duplication of the chip was not actionable.7
by providing notice on a published work, the "bundle of rights" remains the same. See id. §
8.01[A], at 8-12. A copyright owner's rights will vary, however, depending upon the kind of
work that has been copyrighted. Id. (citing Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp.
416, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)). Nevertheless, an unauthorized assertion of any of the rights
granted to a copyright owner is an infringement of the copyright. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra
note 60, § 8.01[A], at 8-12 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 266 F. Supp. 337, 339
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) and United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630,
633 (S.D. Tex. 1959)). For a discussion of the various qualifications of a copyright owner's
"bundle of rights," see 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 60, §§ 8.02-.08, 8.12-.13, 8.15-.18, 8.20.
" Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 174-75 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). In Data Cash, the court, relying upon
the original section 117, applied pre-1978 law to determine whether a computer program in
its object stage, see supra note 59, may be copyrighted. See 480 F. Supp. at 1068. The
Tandy court, on the other hand, considered the original section 117, and thus pre-1978 law,
to be inapplicable to the question of a computer program's copyrightability. See 524 F.
Supp. at 174-75.
' 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. IM. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
11 480 F. Supp. at 1065. In addition to alleging copyright infringement, the plaintiff
asserted that the defendant engaged in unfair competition "by importing, distributing, sell-
ing, marketing and advertising as its own copies of plaintiff's ROM." Id. at 1069-70 (foot-
note omitted). The court denied the plaintiff's motion to enjoin the alleged unfair competi-
tion, id. at 1072, however, because the plaintiff could not prove any of the required elements
for a preliminary injunction, id. at 1071-72. See generally Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp.,
589 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Kolz v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 747, 748
(7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (specifying the requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunc-
tion). Furthermore, the court noted that, based upon the facts presented by the parties, it
could not even determine if the defendants engaged in unfair competition since the manner
in which the ROM chip was duplicated was unclear. See 480 F. Supp. at 1071 (citing Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (App. Ct. 1970)).
11 480 F. Supp. at 1066; see supra note 59.
7 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69. The court stated that the defendants' ROM silicon chip was
not really a copy of the computer program developed for the plaintiff. Id. In reaching this
conclusion, the court found analogous support in several cases which have held that a com-
pleted building is not a duplication of its architectural outline. Id. at 1068 (citing Nucor
Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 391 n.8 (8th Cir. 1973) and Smith
v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 755, 345 P.2d 546, 553 (Ct. App. 1959)); see Katz, Copyright
Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and Designs, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 224,
236 (1954). Thus, the court reasoned, a computer program can be copied at common law
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Stating that the chip is merely a mechanical part of the computer
which cannot be "'see[n] and read' with the naked eye," the court
determined that it was improper subject matter for copyright
protection. 8
Subsequent to the decision in Data Cash, however, the impor-
tance of the White-Smith case waned. 9 In Tandy Corp. v. Per-
sonal Micro Computers, Inc.,s" a federal district court in California
encountered the issue of whether the copying of a silicon chip was
an infringement of the copyright obtained for the written pro-
gram."' The defendants argued that because the plaintiff's chip
was not a "copy" of the computer program itself, there was no in-
fringement of the copyright on the program."2 The court rejected
this argument, holding that a computer program fixed in the form
of a silicon chip is covered by the copyright laws. 3 Reasoning that
only by "another computer program in its flow chart or source phase because these are
comparable technical writings." 480 F. Supp. at 1068. In dictum, the court noted that even
under the 1976 Act, copyright protection does not extend to the object stage of a computer
program. Id. at 1066-67 n.4; see supra note 62.
78 480 F. Supp. at 1069. The Data Cash decision, especially its dictum, see supra note
62, "provoked acute concern within the microcomputer industry," an industry in which
piracy of computer programs has flourished, Schmidt, supra note 1, at 368. Nevertheless, on
appeal from the lower court's opinion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals side-stepped
the issue of computer program copyrightability and affirmed the district court's decision on
the ground that the plaintiff's ROM chip did not bear a copyright notice. Data Cash Syss.,
Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'g on other grounds 480 F.
Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979). For an in-depth discussion of the statutory formality require-
ment of copyright notice, see 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 60, §§ 7.02-.15.
79 See infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
80 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
81 Id. at 173. The plaintiff, Tandy Corporation, claimed that, with the exception of sev-
eral items of identification, the defendants had copied the computer program used in con-
nection with plaintiff's Radio Shack TRS-80 home computer. Id. In addition, Tandy Corpo-
ration alleged that the defendants then used this program in their own home computer, the
PMC-80. Id.
82 Id. In the Data Cash case, both parties assumed that the silicon chip was a duplica-
tion of the plaintiff's computer program. 480 F. Supp. at 1068. Consequently, it was the
Data Cash court which raised the question of whether the ROM chip was, in fact, a "copy"
of the original computer program. See id.
83 524 F. Supp. at 173. Relying upon the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act,
the court stated that the form in which a particular work is fixed has no effect upon the
copyrightability of the work. Id.; supra note 66. Indeed, the legislative history clearly reveals
that the basic copyright requirement of fixation is satisfied where the subject matter is fixed
in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indi-
cia, .. . [or is] embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic,
sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form .... [or is] capable of
perception directly or by means of any machine or device now known or later
developed.
H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 52. The legislative history further indicates that the fixation
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"a computer program is a 'work of authorship'. . . , and ... that
a silicon chip is [a] 'tangible medium of expression,'" the court
concluded that such a device falls clearly within the purview of the
Act. s4
It is submitted that misinterpretation of the original section
117 led the Data Cash court to apply pre-1978 law, in the form of
the White-Smith rationale, and thus to hold that the silicon chip
was improper subject matter for copyright protection. 5 As the
Tandy court later recognized, however, the "duplication of a chip
* * * is simply the copying of a chip," rather than a computer use of
copyrighted material. 6 As such, the court determined, the original
section 117 is inapplicable when the copyrightability of a computer
program is at issue.8 7 Despite Tandy's unequivocal treatment of
the issue, however, uncertainty still remains as to the
copyrightability of a computer program in its "object" stage.88
concept is also significant to the question whether a work is entitled to statutory or common
law copyright protection. Id. Indeed, while a fixed subject matter is eligible for federal stat-
utory copyright protection, the protection afforded to an unfixed work is limited to a state's
common law of copyright. Id.
84 524 F. Supp. at 173. In addition to claiming that the "copy" of the chip evidenced an
infringement of its copyright, the plaintiff contended that the defendants may have dupli-
cated the ROM chip by copying a visual or printed readout of the program, and then im-
pressing it on the silicon chip. Id. at 174. In dictum, the court stated that if such an "unau-
thorized duplication" could be established, then it would certainly be actionable under the
copyright laws. Id. at 175.
A somewhat related issue has arisen concerning the availability of copyright protection
for the electronically displayed visual images appearing on the screen of a video game. See
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 853 (2d Cir. 1982). In Stern, the defendants
argued that copyright protection could be secured only for the written computer program
that determines the visual images displayed in the game, rather than for the images them-
selves. Id. at 855. The court rejected this argument, and, after carefully examining the vari-
ous sights and sounds of the game, concluded "that its repetitive sequence of images is
copyrightable as an audiovisual display." Id. at 857. In reaching this decision, the court
further noted that the player's participation in the game did not prevent the audiovisual
work from being copyrighted, even though the sequence of images might vary from game to
game. Id. at 856-57.
8" See Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 174-75 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) ("[t]his court is not . . . convinced of the merits of the basis of. . . [the Data
Cash] decision"); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 60, § 8.08, at 8-108.2 (characterizing the Data
Cash holding as "questionable").
:6 524 F. Supp. at 175 (emphasis in original).
7 Id. at 174-75. The Tandy court observed that the original section 117 was not in-
tended by Congress to be a "loophole" which would allow a computer program, fixed in the
form of a silicon chip, to be copied. Id. at 175. To construe it as such, the court noted, would
severely limit the potential ability to copyright computer programs. Id.; see infra text ac-
companying note 95.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 74-84. The difference of opinion exemplified
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It is suggested that the continuing confusion regarding the
ability to copyright "object" programs stems from both judicial
and legislative inertia. In Data Cash, the Seventh Circuit declined
to address dictum in the district court's opinion which explicitly
asserted that computer programs in their "object" stage are not
copyrightable under the 1976 Act. 9 Additionally, although Con-
gress' recent Software Copyright Amendment has added a defini-
tion of "computer program" to section 10190 and has revised sec-
tion 117 to clarify the proprietary rights of owners of copies of
computer programs, 1 both the amendment and its legislative his-
by the Data Cash and Tandy decisions reflects, to a certain degree, the disagreement among
members of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU). Schmidt, supra note 1, at 369. CONTU was established by Congress in 1974, see
Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 1873 (1974), to make specific
recommendations as to the necessity for legislative change in the area of computer software
copyrightability, see id. § 201(c), 88 Stat. at 1873-74. The CONTU final report, however,
evidenced a sharp division of opinion among some of the Commission's members. See NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
29, 92 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONTU, FINAL REPORT]. While the CONTU majority
expressed the view that copyright protection should extend to computer programs, see id. at
29, Commissioner Hersey, in a dissenting opinion, argued that a computer program, being
merely "a machine control element," should not be considered copyrightable subject matter,
id. at 69-70 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Notably, several commentators have expressed
some measure of support for Commissioner Hersey's observations. See, e.g., M. Pope & P.
Pope, supra note 59, at 529, 553; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 371.
11 See Data Cash, 628 F.2d at 1041; supra note 78.
90 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), as amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §
10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980); see supra note 58. The recent amendment adding a definition of
"'computer program"' to section 101 describes a program as "a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Act of Dec.
12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028.
91 Section 117 was amended in 1980 to read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of an-
other copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the com-
puter program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights
in the program. Adaptation so prepared may be transferred only with the authori-
zation of the copyright owner.
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (amending 17 U.S.C. §
117 (Supp. III 1979)) (presently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980)).
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tory fail to address the copyrightability of an "object" program."'
It is submitted, therefore, that further legislation is necessary in
this area. 3 Indeed, because the object code may, in fact, be cop-
ied, 4 it is illogical to afford copyright protection to the written
"source" stage of a computer program if such protection effectively
will be lost by a subsequent duplication of the silicon chip.9 5
92 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482. The legisla-
tive history of the Software Copyright Amendment merely states that the amendment was
designed to clarify the law of copyright governing computer software. See id.
93 See infra text accompanying notes 148-59.
94 See Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980). In Data Cash, the Seventh
Circuit observed that the plaintiff had "the erroneous belief that [its] program could not be
copied directly from the ROM [chip] . . . . " 628 F.2d at 1043 (emphasis added). The court
reasoned, however, that this belief was insufficient to excuse the plaintiff from its failure to
have a copyright notice affixed to the ROM or to any other part of the plaintiff's computer
chess game. Id. at 1043-44.
95 See supra note 87. A number of commentators have attacked the law of copyright as
an inadequate means of protecting computer software. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case
For Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281," 344-48 (1970); Note, Software Protection: Patents, Copyrights, and
Trade Secrets, 35 ALB. L. REV. 695, 709-10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Albany Note]; Note,
Computer Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing Proprietary Protection Policy, 40
BROOKLYN L. REV. 116, 121-23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brooklyn Note]; Note, Protection
of Computer Software-A Hard Problem, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 180, 194-96 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Drake Note]; Note, supra note 2, at 1549-50. The major argument raised against
copyright protection of computer programs is that it only protects the form of a particular
work's expression, not the ideas contained in the work. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 105 (1879); see Albany Note, supra, at 709; Drake Note, supra, at 194; Note, supra note
2, at 1550; supra note 57. Another alleged disadvantage of copyright protection is that such
protection is subject to the "fair use" doctrine, which permits reasonable use of copyrighted
material without the copyright owner's consent. E.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Toksvig v.
Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950); see Albany Note, supra, at 709-10; Brook-
lyn Note, supra, at 122. Notably, section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act adopts the "fair
use" rule "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching. . . , scholar-
ship, or research .... "See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979). The difficulty in detecting
piracy of computer programs is a third argument raised by commentators against copyright
protection. See Albany Note, supra, at 170; Note, supra note 2, at 1550. Finally, it has been
asserted that antitrust problems may arise if a large manufacturer, such as IBM, obtains
copyrights on many or all of the programs that it creates. See Breyer, supra, at 348. For a
discussion of the first amendment limitation upon copyright protection, see 1 M. NimmR,
supra note 60, § 1.10[A]-[D].
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TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
The Preemption Issue
In contrast to the areas of patent and copyright protection,
there exists today no dispute as to the applicability of trade secret
protection 6 to computer software . 7 Notwithstanding the consen-
sus that software is suitable subject matter for trade secret protec-
tion, developers of computer programs may encounter an initial
obstacle to securing this protection. The issue that arises is
whether state-created trade secret laws are preempted by federal
patent and copyright laws covering the same subject matter.98
With respect to the federal patent laws, it appears settled that
state trade secret law is not preempted.9 The leading case in this
" There appear to be two major grounds upon which trade secret protection is based.
The first is that a trade secret is a property right. E.g., Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prods.
Co., 31 F.2d 293, 296 (N.D. Ill. 1929), aff'd, 36 F.2d 623, 625 (7th Cir. 1930); Herold v.
Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911, 913 (6th Cir. 1919); see Schmidt, supra note 1, at
389. This position, however, is against the weight of authority. See R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS
§ 6, at 12 (1953). The United States Supreme Court itself has eschewed the property ratio-
nale as the basis for trade secret protection. See E.I. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). In Masland, the Court observed that the true basis for
an action for trade secret misuse is the desire to maintain the confidentiality of business
relationships. Id. Indeed, the Court declared that "[t]he property may be denied but the
confidence cannot be." Id. Notably, some courts have relied upon both the property and
confidentiality concepts as grounds for trade secret protection. See, e.g., International In-
dus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 915 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957). Regardless of the ideological ground for trade
secret protection, however, it is clear that a right of protection does exist. R. ELLIS, supra, §
7, at 13. Indeed, in 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved a "Uniform Trade Secrets Act" which subsequently was approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association. See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.03[3], at 4A-83 to -85 & n.26.
" See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.03, at 4A-79 ("[u]nlike its statutory cousins,
whose applicability is in issue, traditional trade secret law clearly applies to programs"). At
least one court has declared expressly that "computer software is protectable under the
trade secret doctrine," Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Pinckney Whitfield, Tracor Com-
puting Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999, 1003 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977), while
other courts have held in favor of such protection in the computer area, see, e.g., University
Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1974).
98 See infra text accompanying notes 99-132.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 100-09. At one time, the very existence of trade
secret law was uncertain. See Albany Note, supra note 95, at 714. In Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
state's unfair competition law was preempted by the federal patent laws. Id. at 230-31. The
Court concluded that there was indeed such a conflict between the laws as to result in pre-
emption, reasoning that to permit "a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent
the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to
permit the State to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs
to the public." Id. at 231-32; accord Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,
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area is Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,10 decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 1974. In holding that Ohio's trade secret
law did not conflict with the federal patent laws,10' Chief Justice
Burger examined the interaction of the basic policies underlying
these two methods of protection.0 2 Initially, the Court dismissed
the possibility that an inventor of unpatentable subject matter
would apply for a patent, observing that the availability of trade
secret protection would not affect such a decision. 03 Thus, Chief
Justice Burger reasoned, the existence of concurrent trade secret
protection would not endanger the patent law policy objective of
237-38 (1964). Fearful that the Sears doctrine would be applied to state trade secret law,
several lower courts attempted to distinguish between the law of unfair competition and
trade secret law upon the ground that the latter involves the concept of confidentiality. See,
e.g., Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 934 (1966); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 IlM. 2d 379, 385-87, 212 N.E.2d 865,
868-69 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966); Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding &
Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 254, 213 A.2d 769, 772-73 (1965). In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653 (1969), the Supreme Court was faced squarely with the question whether state laws
governing trade secrets were preempted by the federal patent laws. Id. at 672. The Court
openly avoided the issue, however, leaving it to the state courts to determine whether these
two areas of state and federal law could be redonciled. See id. at 675. The dissenters con-
tended that the majority's failure to address definitively the issue presented was in direct
conflict with the Sears decision. Id. at 676-77 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). As a result of the Supreme Court's irresolution, differences of opinion developed
among the circuit courts of appeals as to whether federal patent law preempted state trade
secret law. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1086-87 (6th Cir. 1973)
(preemption), rev'd, 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216,
225 (2d Cir. 1971) (no preemption); Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d
1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1970) (no preemption), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Servs.,
Inc. v. Tesco Chems, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172 (5th Cir. 1969) (no preemption).
100 416 U.S. 470 (1974). The plaintiff in Kewanee alleged that the defendant had misap-
propriated trade secrets in the form of certain processing and manufacturing techniques
relating to the production of synthetic crystals. Id. at 473. Although both the district court
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the defendants had, indeed, violated
Ohio's trade secret law, the Sixth Circuit found this law to be in conflict with the federal
patent laws and thus preempted. Id. at 474.
101 Id.
102 See infra text accompanying notes 103-08. The Court stated generally that the pri-
mary objectives of the patent laws are the encouragement of invention, increased public
disclosure, and promotion of the policy that information "which is in the public domain
cannot be removed therefrom" by state action. 416 U.S. at 480-81. The Court also noted
that the encouragement of invention, the maintenance of fair dealing in business relation-
ships, and "the subsidization of research and development . . . within large companies"
have been recognized as the main goals of trade secret protection. Id. at 481-82. Chief Jus-
tice Burger focused upon the patent policy of disclosure because that, according to the Chief
Justice, is the "[most] difficult objective of the patent law to reconcile with trade secret
law." Id. at 484.
103 416 U.S. at 483.
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increased public disclosure.1 "" Additionally, the Court declared, the
existence of trade secret laws would not affect an innovator's deci-
sion to forego the cost and risk of patent protection when the sub-
ject matter's patentability is uncertain.105 Finally, the Court ex-
amined the situation in which the invention is "clearly
patentable."10 After addressing the comparative shortcomings of
trade secret protection,107 the Court concluded that in such a situa-
tion, there is a greater likelihood that the innovator would choose
to patent his discovery, but that, regardless of the choice, the ulti-
mate congressional objective of public disclosure would not be de-
feated.108 Notably, the Kewanee rationale has been applied in the
context of protection of computer systems.109
Copyright preemption of state trade secret protection, unlike
patent preemption, remains an unsettled area of the law.110 Under
section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 11 state rights "that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright" are preempted.112 The resolution of the preemption
104 Id.
105 Id. at 487.
106 Id. at 489.
107 Id. at 489-90. The Court observed that the protection provided by the law of trade
secrets is somewhat "weaker" than that afforded by the patent laws. Id. While trade secret
law permits a competitor to independently discover and use the same subject matter as the
original, patent law, on the other hand, forbids any use of the invention for at least a limited
period of time. Id. at 490 ("[w]here patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions
relatively as a sieve").
108 Id. at 489-91. The Court noted that, according to the ripeness-of-time concept of
invention, subsequent independent discovery within a relatively short period of time would
be inevitable, even if an inventor chooses to keep his discovery a secret and avoids the
patent law disclosure requirement. Id. at 490-91. Additionally, the Court stated that the risk
of unintentional disclosure which accompanies trade secret protection is considerable. Id.
Thus, concluded the Court, in the long-run, society's interest in disclosure would be fur-
thered. Id.
109 See, e.g., Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 645-46, 358 N.E.2d
804, 806-07 (1976); People v. Serrata, 62 Cal. App. 3d 9, 19-20, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144, 150 (Ct.
App. 1976); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 111-12 (Del.
Ch. 1975).
110 See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.03, at 4A-77 to -78; infra text accompanying
notes 111-32.
" 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
Id. § 301(a). Section 301(b) serves as a qualification of the broad preemption lan-
guage of section 301(a), reading in part:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the com-
mon law or statutes of any State with respect to
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
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issue in this area, therefore, seems to hinge upon whether state
trade secret protection is equivalent to copyright protection.113 As
indicated by the following discussion, courts have reached differing
conclusions when faced with this question. 11
4
In Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc.," 5 a federal district
court in Alabama held that section 301, by virtue of its preemptive
effect, precluded the plaintiff's cause of action against a competitor
for misappropriation of secret drawings and specifications of cer-
tain aircraft engines. 116 In so deciding, the court reasoned that the
state claim was, in effect, an attempt to enforce the same rights as
those contained in the federal copyright law. 1 7 Although other
courts have followed the line of reasoning exemplified by Avco,118
none of these cases dealt with copyright preemption in the context
of computer programs.119
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.
Id. § 301(b). For a discussion of the rights protected by copyright law, see supra note 72.
The final report of the CONTU specifically stated that trade secret protection for computer
programs is not entirely precluded merely because copyright protection is also available. See
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 44.
'M' See Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Syss., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
25,207, at 16,157 (M.D. Ala. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir. 1982).
114 See infra text accompanying notes 115-32.
115 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,207, at 16,155 (M.D. Ala. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir. 1982).
116 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH), at 16,159; cf. BPI Syss., Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208,
211 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (implying that in the context of computer software, misappropriation
of trade secret cause of action would be preempted by Copyright Act if the property alleg-
edly misappropriated had been copyrighted). The Eleventh Circuit in Avco, unlike the dis-
trict court, found it unnecessary to address the preemption issue, ruling instead that the
plaintiff's causes of action were time-barred. 676 F.2d at 495. This finding, the court com-
mented, "'preempts the preemption question' on appeal." Id. at 498. It appears likely, how-
ever, that should the issue again come before the federal district court in Alabama, the
result would be the same.
"1 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH), at 16,157. The court stated that the plaintiff's claim,
alleging that the defendant copied and prepared derivative works from certain drawings and
specifications in order to obtain approval to sell airplane engine parts, "fits squarely into"
the 1976 Copyright Act sections which permit only the copyright owner to reproduce the
copyrighted work and prepare derivative works. Id. at 16,157 & n.2; see also 17 U.S.C. §
106(1)(2) (Supp. II 1979).
118 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 852-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (state claims of conversion and tortious interference with contract pre-
empted); Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(state misappropriation claim preempted).
'9 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), the plaintiffs entered into a contract with former President Ford to publish his
memoirs and subsequently negotiated an exclusive agreement with Time, Inc. for the publi-
cation of certain excerpts of the memoirs, promising not to authorize any other publication
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In Warrington Associates, Inc. v. Real-Time Engineering Sys-
tems,120 an Illinois federal district court decided the copyright pre-
emption issue in a manner contrary to Avco. 121 In Warrington, the
plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had misappropri-
ated the plaintiff's secret computer software programs. 122 The de-
fendant moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that it was pre-
empted by the 1976 Copyright Act.1 23 The court denied the
motion,124 holding that the Act did not preempt the trade secret
cause of action. 125 Recognizing the distinctions between the scope
in Canada or the United States prior to April 23, 1979. Id. at 849. On April 7, 1979, however,
an article appeared which focused upon former President Ford's account of the Nixon par-
don, allegedly prepared from a copy of the unpublished Ford memoirs. Id. The plaintiffs
brought suit against the publishers of that article, alleging copyright infringement, conver-
sion, and interference with contract. Id. at 849-50. The court held that the latter two asser-
tions were preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act because they sought to protect
rights which were equivalent to the rights protected by the copyright laws. See id. at 852-54.
The court imposed a strict test for the determination of the equivalence of protected rights,
declaring that "[t]he state cause of action must protect rights under the facts of a particular
case which are qualitatively different from the rights of reproduction, performance, distri-
bution, or display." Id. at 852 (emphasis in original). Upon examination of the facts and the
allegations of conversion and tortious interference with contract, the court concluded that
the rights protected under these causes of action were not qualitatively different from the
rights of reproduction, distribution, and preparation of derivative works already protected
by copyright. See id. at 852-53.
In Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979), the
plaintiff, in a two-count complaint, alleged that the defendant had both infringed plaintiff's
copyright on a book and misappropriated specific information contained in the book. Id. at
22-23. The court concluded that, on the basis of the pleading, the two counts could not be
distinguished and, therefore, the misappropriation claim was preempted under section 301
of the Copyright Act. Id. at 25-26.
"20 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. IlM. 1981).
121 Id. at 369.
122 Id. at 368. The facts in Warrington raised the additional issue of whether the plain-
tiff forfeited its ability to obtain trade secret protection because it had disclosed certain
confidential information, in the form of a user's manual, in order to secure copyright protec-
tion. Id. The court stated that such a disclosure could result in the unavailability of trade
secret protection. Id. at 369. Because it could be inferred from the record, however, that the
plaintiff may have relied upon "assurances of confidentiality from the users" of the plain-
tiff's software, the court declined to render a final determination on the disclosure issue. Id.
123 Id. at 368. The defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's misappropriation claim
was treated by the court as a motion for summary judgment. See id.
124 Id. at 370.
25 Id. at 369; cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433, 435
(Del. Ch. 1971) (trade secret claim not preempted notwithstanding that plaintiff failed to
secure copyright protection for design drawings of its computer), affd, 297 A.2d 437, 439
(Del. 1972); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 443-44 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (Ohio statute regulating licensing and distribution of motion pictures not preempted
by the Act); Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 324, 325 (N.D. Iowa 1977) ("[flederal copyright law preempts only state unfair com-
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of protection afforded by the two methods,26 the court stated that
copyright protection extends to the "particular expression" of an
idea, 127 whereas trade secret law provides protection for the idea
itself.128 Additionally, noted the court, the basis for the wrong
sought to be redressed by trade secret law necessarily involves
some form of breach of trust or confidentiality, whereas the prohi-
bition imposed by copyright law extends merely to copying.12 The
court further reasoned, based upon the legislative history of the
Act, that Congress did not intend to preempt the common law
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. 130 Finally, the
court observed that the law of trade secrecy' 3' is more likely to
conflict with, and thereby be preempted by, the patent rather than
the copyright laws, and noted that the Kewanee Court effectively
had silenced any such claim.13 2
petition laws which clash with federal law"). Contra Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc.,
2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,207, at 16,159 (M.D. Ala. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 676
F.2d 494 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp.
848, 852-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Copyright Act preempted state claims of conversion and tor-
tious interference with contract).
126 522 F. Supp. at 368.
12 Id.; see supra note 57; see also Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co.,
462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (expression is protected "by forbidding copying").
128 522 F. Supp. at 368 (citing, for example, Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film
Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1953)). For a criticism of the distinction which has been
made between the expression of an idea and the idea itself, see Libott, Round the Prickly
Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 16 ASCAP 30
(1968).
129 522 F. Supp. at 369; see Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 18,
160 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1968).
130 522 F. Supp. at 368-69. As the court observed, the legislative history of section 301
indicates that "[t]he evolving common law [right] of ... trade secrets ... would remain
unaffected as long as the [cause] of action contain[s] elements, such as an invasion of per-
sonal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright
infringement." H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5748.
131 It should be noted that trade secret law is not entirely decisional Criminal statutes
directly or indirectly dealing with theft of trade secrets, for example, have been enacted by
approximately one-half of the states. D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.03[4], at 4A-86; see,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 15-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(4) (1970); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 752.771(3)-.772 (Supp.
1968-1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00(6), 165.07 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
75.1 (1981). For a discussion of other state and federal statutes which may impact upon the
law of trade secrets, see Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 909, 944-47, 955-56 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as Bender, Trade Secret Protection].
For a discussion of the criminal law aspects of trade secrets in the context of computer
systems, see D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4.07.
132 See 522 F. Supp. at 369. Compare Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing
Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 44 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (misappropriation claim preempted if it merely
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The Disclosure Problem
Notwithstanding the preemption obstacle, trade secret law has
been the most frequently used method of computer software pro-
tection.13 3 Unlike patent and copyright protection, however, trade
secrecy necessarily precludes public disclosure of the alleged se-
cret.13 4 Does this mean that total nondisclosure is a prerequisite to
alleges copying of computer software) with Compumarketing Servs. Corp. v. Business Envel-
ope Mfrs., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 776, 777-78 (N.D. IMI. 1972) (misappropriation claim not pre-
empted since the allegations go beyond mere copying). For a criticism of the "slippery"
distinctions made between misappropriation and copying, see Note, The "Copying-Misap-
propriation" Distinction: False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-Emp-
tion Doctrine, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 1444, 1461-63 (1971). Notwithstanding such criticism,
most courts have held that the protections against copying and misappropriation are suffi-
ciently distinguishable so as to permit the latter to be governed by state law. See, e.g., Tape
Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 351 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 902 (1971); Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publications, Inc. 264 F. Supp. 603, 606
(C.D. Cal. 1967); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 537-38, 82 Cal. Rptr.
798, 806 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest
Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 881-82, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556-57 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1964).
133 See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4.05[3], at 4-53; Bender, Trade Secret Protection,
supra note 131, at 909; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 386. Indicative of the widespread use of
trade secret law as a method of computer software protection are the numerous cases con-
cerning misuse or misappropriation of software-related trade secrets. See, e.g., University
Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974); Electronic
Data Syss., Corp. v. Kinder, 497 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1974); Structural Dynamics Re-
search Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 315-16 (N.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part per curiam, 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F.
Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Pinckney Whitfield,
Tracor Computing Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999, 1000-01 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1977); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433, 435 (Del. Ch.
1971), affd, 297 A.2d 437 (Del. 1972). The software industry's preference for trade secret
protection is based primarily upon the perceived advantages of such protection. See D.
BENDER, supra note 1, § 4.0513], at 4-59. These advantages include the absence of a public
disclosure requirement, the favorable domestic and foreign attitudes toward trade secrets,
and the potential for unlimited duration of trade secret protection. See id. (citing the results
of a study conducted by Kidder, Peabody, & Co.). There are, however, a number of alleged
disadvantages of trade secret protection. See infra text accompanying notes 144-47.
131 See Bender, Trade Secret Protection, supra note 131, at 913. In the copyright area,
there is a general requirement that published works be deposited in the Copyright Office for
use by the Library of Congress. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(a)(b) (Supp. III 1979). The Register of
Copyrights, however, has exempted computer programs, in their "machine-readable" form,
from this general requirement. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19 (c)(5) (1981); see also 17 U.S.C. §
407(c) (Supp. III 1979) (Register of Copyrights has the power to exempt materials from the
deposit requirement). With respect to computer programs which are sought to be registered
with the Copyright Office, the Code of Federal Regulations provides for the following
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:92
securing trade secret protection? If not, then what is the permissi-
ble breadth of disclosure? 13 5 These inquiries are central to an in-
vestigation into whether computer program developers can avail
themselves of trade secret protection. 136
In determining whether particular subject matter is, indeed, a
"secret, ' 13 7 courts necessarily have engaged in case-by-case exami-
nations of the factual circumstances surrounding the claim of trade
secrecy. 138  Illustrative of this approach is Motorola, Inc. v.
mandatory deposit:
(A) For published or unpublished computer programs, one copy of identifying
portions of the program, reproduced in a form visually perceptible without the aid
of a machine or device, either on page or in microform. For these purposes, "iden-
tifying portions" shall mean either the first and last 25 pages or equivalent units
of the program if reproduced on paper, or at least the first and last 25 pages or
equivalent units of the program if reproduced in microform, together with the
page or equivalent unit containing the copyright notice, if any ....
37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A) (1981). Patent law requires that an applicant submit the
following material to the Patent or Trademark Office: an oath or declaration; drawings, if
applicable; a specification, including a detailed description of the invention; and a filing fee.
P. ROSENBERG, supra note 12, § 13.00, at 13-2. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), such material is not subject to public
scrutiny by reason of express congressional mandate. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976); P. RosEN-
BERG, supra note 12, § 3.09, at 3-13. For discussions of the utility of public disclosure, see
Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 31-32 (1962); Comment, Industrial Espionage:
Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 911, 913-14
(1967).
135 The Restatement of Torts appears to suggest that trade secret protection may be
obtained despite the absence of total nondisclosure. See RESTATEME .T OF TORTS § 757 com-
ment b (1939) ("a substantial element of secrecy must exist"); see also Bender, Trade Se-
cret Protection, supra note 131, at 928 ("[s]ecrecy need not be absolute"). The fact that a
particular work is copyrighted, for example, "does not ... disclose the trade secret or elimi-
nate its mantle of confidentiality." Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Syss., Inc.,
522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
"I Cf. Schmidt, supra note 1, at 387 (rapid growth in the number of computer pro-
grams may result in the unavailability of trade secret protection).
117 If particular information is generally known, then it is clear that it is not a protect-
able trade secret. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa.
1970); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Pinckney Whitfield, Tracor Computing Corp., 6
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999, 1008 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977); Bender, Trade Secret
Protection, supra note 131, at 928. The specific use of a combination of several general
ideas, however, may be considered a trade secret. See Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v.
Pinckney Whitfield, Tracor Computing Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999,
1008 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977); cf. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
350 F.2d 134, 139 (9th Cir. 1965) (specifications for, and relationships of, publicly known
mechanical parts constitute a trade secret since neither the specifications nor the relation-
ships were themselves generally known).
138 See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 913-23 (E.D. Pa.
1970); see also infra text accompanying notes 139 & 141.
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Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.,139 in which the court's re-
jection of the plaintiff's misappropriation claim was based upon a
distinct lack of effort on the part of the plaintiff to keep the mate-
rial secret. 1 °0 The court found particularly significant the plaintiff's
failure to implement the nondisclosure agreement between itself
and the defendants, former employees, as well as the fact that
"substantially all of the claims were revealed [in the marketed
product itself,] in patents and trade literature or [were] generally
known in the trade . "," It should be noted that the court's
analysis was grounded upon the widely recognized approach of the
Restatement of Torts, which lists several factors to be considered
in the evaluation of a trade secret.1
42
"1 366 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz. 1973). In Motorola, the plaintiff-employer initially al-
leged that almost every step in its semiconductor manufacturing process was a trade secret.
Id. at 1184. Prior to trial, most of these allegations were dropped. Id. The alleged trade
secret items which remained related to the manufacture of two semiconductor devices, a
plastic encapsulated TO-92 and an aluminum-packaged TO-3. Id. at 1184-85. Although
upon termination of the defendants' employment the plaintiff-employer reminded them of
their entrance into a restrictive nondisclosure agreement, the defendants were not informed
as to what the agreement covered. Id. at 1185. Additionally, the evidence established that
the plaintiffs records did not even contain a statement of what the plaintiff believed to be
its trade secrets. Id.
140 Id. at 1183-88.
141 Id. at 1188. The court observed that the plaintiff had permitted tours of the semi-
conductor production line, which included the viewing of the items claimed as trade secrets,
and did not require any type of nondisclosure acknowledgment. Id. at 1186. Furthermore,
the court noted, the "succession and order of manufacturing and testing steps" was revealed
by the nature of the product itself. Id. at 1187. Finally, the court stated that many of the
claimed trade secrets were disclosed in the plaintiff's own patents. Id.
142 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). After providing that a trade
secret is not susceptible of precise definition, see id., the Restatement lists the following
criteria to be considered in determining whether particular information is a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside.., the employer's busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5)
the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6)
the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.
Id.; see, e.g., Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 263-64 (S.D. Cal.
1958), aff'd per curiam, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961);
Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Pinckney Whitfield, Tracor Computing Corp., 6 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999, 1007-09 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977). In an employment rela-
tionship, the employer has the burden of proving that the given information is a trade se-
cret. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
Satisfaction of this burden alone, however, will not entitle the employer to equitable relief.
See Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 259, 213 A.2d 769,
775 (1965) (specifying four elements that the employer must establish); see also Wexler v.
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In the context of computer software, it thus appears that a
program owner's willingness to enter into numerous licensing ar-
rangements will not automatically preclude trade secret protection,
provided that the licensee is contractually bound to keep his use of
the program confidential. 143 It must be emphasized, however, that
such protection may be lost by virtue of some factual circumstance
surrounding the arrangements. 1 4 Furthermore, given the extensive
distribution of computer programs, 4 5 detection of those persons
skilled "in deciphering and penetrating valuable programs" be-
comes difficult, thereby increasing the risk of unintentional disclo-
sure. 4 ' The fact that antitrust claims may be lodged against large
developers is an additional disadvantage of trade secrecy.1 47 Recog-
Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 577, 160 A.2d 430, 434 (1960) (specifying two elements that the
employer must prove). For a discussion of the relief to which an employer is entitled in the
absence of a nondisclosure agreement, see McClain, Injunctive Relief Against Employees
Using Confidential Information, 23 Ky. L.J. 248 (1935).
143 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974) (subject matter
remains secret even if divulged, provided there is an obligation of nondisclosure or nonuse);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 110-11 (Del. Ch. 1975)
(trade secrets exist in plaintiff's logic design of minicomputer since parties with access to
the material were under an obligation of confidence); see also Management Science Am.,
Inc. v. Cyborg Syss., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 921, 925-26 (N.D. IMI. 1978)
(extensive leasing of computer payroll system under licensing agreements requiring confi-
dentiality does not destroy, as a matter of law, a claim of trade secrecy). Rather than selling
a computer program, the program owner usually chooses to enter into a licensing agreement
whereby the licensee is permitted to use the program for a specified fee. See Raysman &
Brown, Trade-Secret Law Protection of Software, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 1. Typi-
cally, the licensee's use of the program is limited to one computer located at the customer's
facilities. Id.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 137-42; supra notes 141-42. It has been stated
that effective secret protection is dependent upon a program owner's ability to "take ex-
traordinary precautions" to maintain the program's secrecy. See M. Pope & P. Pope, supra
note 59, at 533. Compare Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F.
Supp. 1173, 1186-88 (D. Ariz. 1973) (indicating the lack of precautionary measures taken by
plaintiff) with Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1234-35 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) (plaintiff acted with the "utmost caution"), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th
Cir. 1972). Furthermore, trade secret rights will be lost if competitors are able to indepen-
dently discover the same information or process. M. Pope & P. Pope, supra note 59, at 533.
'41 See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 345 ("more than 15,000 programs . . . are written
each day in the United States"). It appears that this extensive development is intended
partly to satisfy the high demand for computer programs in the areas of bookkeeping, pay-
roll, and inventory control. See id. at 354.
'46 See id. at 389. Various technical protections of computer programs, which have the
effect of rendering the programs difficult to decipher and analyze, have been suggested as
additional protective devices which program developers may use. See, e.g., D. BENDER,
supra note 1, § 4.05[3], at 4-59; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 388-89.
147 Schmidt, supra note 1, at 389. A number of recent antitrust cases have involved
litigants who were either computer manufacturers or software developers. See, e.g., Sym-
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nizing these inadequacies of trade secret protection, it is submitted
that legislative action is necessary to ensure more effective trade
secret protection of the computer software industry.
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Having discussed the major shortcomings of the current forms
of computer program protection, it is appropriate to propose reme-
dial statutory measures. The following statute, by accounting for
the unique characteristics of computer programs,148 is designed pri-
marily to remedy the inadequacies that have developed within the
existent areas of protection.149
(1) Definition: Computer Program.
A computer program is a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a machine capable of being
programmed to bring about a certain result, or to perform a cer-
tain function or task. 150 A machine possessing such capability or
capabilities shall be known as a computer.
A computer program is expressible in any one or more of the
following forms. 5
a) Schematic Program. A schematic program includes, but is
not limited to, any detailed and concise charts, diagrams, and ta-
bles used in the development of a source program.
b) Source Program. A source program is any computer pro-
gramming language, whether written or imprinted on discs, tapes,
drums, or otherwise, derived from a schematic program. Exam-
ples of source programs include, but are not limited to, FOR-
TRAN, BASIC, and COBOL.
c) Assembly Program. An assembly program is any mechani-
cally readable computer language derived from a source program.
bolic Control, Inc. v. IBM, 643 F.2d 1339, 1340 (9th Cir. 1980); California Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d
488, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1977).
4I See supra note 59.
249 See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
1SO The definition of computer program contained in the proposed statutory scheme is
derived substantially from the definition which recently has been added to section 101 of
the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), as amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028. For the text of the definition of computer program con-
tained in section 101, see supra note 90.
'61 The characterizations of the various stages of a computer program included in the
proffered legislation stem from a variety of sources. See, e.g., Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. M11. 979), af'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038,
1040 (7th Cir. 1980); M. Pope & P. Pope, supra note 59, at 530-31. For a brief discussion of
the four phases of a computer program, see supra note 59.
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d) Object Program. An object program is any mechanical der-
ivation of the assembly program, including but not limited to a
silicon chip, which is capable of being inputted into the computer
itself.
(2) Computer Program: Copyrightability; Patentability.
As of the effective date of this section:
a) A computer program expressed in any of the forms defined
in section (1) shall be considered a copyrightable work of author-
ship within the meaning of section 102(a) of Title 17 of the
United States Code.
152
b) The particular ideas, methods, and/or procedures embod-
ied in a computer program which is expressed in any of the forms
defined in section (1) shall be considered a patentable process
within the meaning of section 101 of Title 35 of the United States
Code.1 53
(3) State Trade Secret Law Not Preempted By Federal Copy-
right Law.154
Any right received by a computer program owner under state
trade secret law shall not be preempted automatically by the fed-
eral copyright laws. In any case wherein state trade secret law and
federal copyright law are applicable, such laws must be construed,
if it is reasonable to do so, in such manner as to favor mutual
accommodation.
(4) Disclosure Provisions.
a) Entry by a program owner into one or more lawful ar-
rangements, contractual or otherwise, for another party's confi-
'52 The proposed remedial measure which brings a computer program, in any of its
expressed forms, within the subject matter provision of the copyright laws is based upon the
underlying rationale of Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171,
173 (N.D. Cal. 1981). For a discussion of Tandy's treatment of the question whether com-
puter programs in their "object" stage are copyrightable, see supra text accompanying notes
83-84.
163 Because copyright protection extends only to the particular expression of certain
subject matter, see supra note 57; supra text accompanying note 127, "blanket protection
for the idea embodied in programs" has been "a longtime goal of a portion of the [software]
industry," Root, Protecting Computer Software in the 80's: Practical Guidelines for Evolv-
ing Needs, 8 RUT. COMPUTER & TacH. L.J. 205, 218 & n.71 (1981) (footnote omitted). It is
submitted that the suggested legislation, by allowing program owners to avail themselves of
patent protection, permits the realization of this objective.
' The provision in the proposed statutory scheme which declares that state trade se-
cret protection and federal copyright protection may coexist is derived from the reasoning of
various cases. See Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Syss., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367,
368-69 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 443-44
(S.D. Ohio 1980); Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 431
F. Supp. 324, 325 (N.D. Iowa 1977); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297
A.2d 433, 435 (Del. Ch. 1971), aff'd, 297 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1972); supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
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dential use of an otherwise secret computer program expressed in
any one or more of the forms defined in section (1), shall not re-
sult in the loss of any rights received under state trade secret
law.1 55
b) A computer program expressed in any one or more of the
forms defined in section (1) need not be deposited, in whole or in
part, with any governmental agency. Such deposit shall not be
required for copyright or patent registration, or for use by the
Library of Congress or any other governmental agency. 56
(5) Criminal Sanctions; Civil Liability; Injunctions.
a) Any person or corporate entity who wilfully and for pur-
poses of commercial advantage or private financial gain violates
the rights secured by a program owner under the federal copy-
right or patent laws, or under the applicable common law or stat-
utes of a State, is subject to appropriate criminal penalties. 57
b) Any person or corporate entity who, for any reason, vio-
lates the rights secured by a program owner under the federal
copyright or patent laws, or under the applicable common law or
statutes of a State, is subject to civil liability in a suit for
damages.'
c) If the rights secured by a program owner under the federal
15 The proffered statutory provision which permits a program owner to enter into nu-
merous arrangements for the confidential use 'of a computer program without a resulting
loss of trade secret rights is derived from several decisions suggesting such a result. See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974); Management Science Am.,
Inc. v. Cyborg Syss., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 921, 925-26 (N.D. IM. 1978);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 110-11 (Del. Ch. 1975);
supra note 143.
156 Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(5) (exempting computer programs, expressed in "machine-
readable" form, from requirement of deposit with Library of Congress for copyright regis-
tration); id. § 202.19(e)(1) ("special relief" from deposit with Library of Congress may be
granted by the Register of Copyrights for any published work not exempt from deposit); id.
§ 202.20(d)(1) ("special relief" from deposit required for copyright registration may be
granted by the Register of Copyrights). See generally id. §§ 202.19-.20; supra note 134.
'57 See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. 1 1979) (detailing specifics of criminal offenses with
respect to copyright infringement). A number of jurisdictions have enacted criminal statutes
dealing with theft of trade secrets. See supra note 131. Computer crime, a tangentially re-
lated problem, also has been the subject of legislation in various states. D. BENDER, supra
note 1, § 4.07, at 4-71 & n.44; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1982). It should
be noted that the proposed statute adds a criminal dimension to cases involving a patent
infringement of computer programs. See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.03[4], at 4A-86
(criminal sanctions do not exist for patent infringements).
158 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 11 1979) (detailing specifics of civil remedy for copyright
infringement); 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-289 (1976) (detailing civil remedies available for patent in-
fringement). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see generally D. BENDER, supra note 1, §
4A.03[3], adopted, as of 1981, by Arkansas and Minnesota, provides a civil remedy "for the
actual loss caused by misappropriation." Id. § 4A.03[3], at 4A-84; see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-
1003(a) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3250.03(a) (West 1981).
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copyright or patent laws, or under the applicable common law or
statutes of a State, are violated, a court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant an injunction to prevent or restrain further
violation.159
It is submitted that the proposed statute effectively permits
the obtainment of maximum protection for a computer program at
any stage of its development. By clarifying the definition of a com-
puter program and declaring that copyright and patent protection
are available for each of its expressed forms, the proposal elimi-
nates uncertainties pertaining to whether a particular program is
proper subject matter for such protection.160 Furthermore, the dis-
closure provisions of the suggested legislation aid in assuring ade-
quate trade secret protection by permitting a program owner to
enter into numerous arrangements for the confidential use of a
computer program without a resulting loss of trade secrecy
rights," 1 and, additionally, by preventing any governmentally re-
quired disclosure of the details of a computer program.16 2 The final
section of the statute is intended to deter potential piracy of com-
puter programse 3 and, in the event of such piracy, to provide a
program owner with several adequate avenues of redress.
It is further suggested that a program owner, in order to maxi-
mize the benefits conferred by the proposed legislation, should at-
tempt to secure more than one form of protection. Particularly
useful in this regard is section 3 of the suggested statutory scheme,
for it permits the coexistence of the available methods of computer
program protection. 64 Because the nature of the protection af-
forded by the copyright 65 and patent'66 laws differs, it would ap-
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. III 1979) (injunctive relief available for copyright in-
fringement); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1976) (injunctive relief available for patent infringement).
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see supra note 158, also provides that a court may grant an
injunction for "[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-1002(a)
(Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3250.02(a) (West 1981).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 53-79.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 137-44.
16 See supra note 134.
168 See supra text accompanying note 146.
' See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
168 See Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 472, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Signo Trading
Int'l, Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Cal. 1981); supra note 57; supra text
accompanying note 127; see also Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (expression is protected by "forbidding copying").
166 See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stablin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159 n.7
(6th Cir. 1978); In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 789-91 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see also Schmidt, supra
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pear beneficial for a program owner to employ both methods so as
to obtain protection for the particular expression of, and proce-
dures embodied in, a computer program. Alternatively, if the pro-
gram owner wishes to forego the expense of securing both patent
and copyright protection,' 6 7 or if lasting protection is desired for
the techniques contained in a computer program,16 8 then it is sug-
gested that copyright and trade secret law be used in tandem. The
program owner who chooses to utilize this alternative method of
protection, however, should be aware that the underlying concepts
of the program may be used by competitors who are able to make
fair discoveries of those ideas.169 Such would not be the case if pat-
ent law, rather than the law of trade secrets, is used in conjunction
with copyright protection, since patent protection is not lost if the
processes embodied in a computer program are uncovered
independently. 170
The measures proposed in this Note, by permitting program
owners to obtain clear and comprehensive protection for computer
programs, also foster several important public policies. First, the'
computer program industry will continue to grow because develop-
ers, investors, and lending institutions will be assured that their
note 1, at 362-63; Brooklyn Note, supra note 95, at 123.
Ms See generally 17 U.S.C. § 708(a) (Supp. III 1979) (copyright fees); 35 U.S.C. §
41(a)(b) (1976) (patent fees); G. ROSE, 1980-1981 PATENT LAW HANDBOOK 343, 371 (1981)
(increased patent fees for international applications); WHAT EVERYBODY SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS (D. Dible ed. 1978) (discussing need for, and
fees charged by, patent attorneys or patent agents with regard to the preparation of patent
applications).
166 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). Section 154 limits the duration of a patent obtained for a
particular invention to a 17-year period. Trade secrecy, on the other hand, is capable of
protecting the underlying concepts contained in a computer program until such time as they
are no longer secret. See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 4A.03[5], at 4A-91; see also A. SEIDL &
R. PANITCH, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS 15 (1973).
169 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); M. Pope & P. Pope,
supra note 59, at 533. In Kewanee, the Supreme Court declared that trade secret protection
may be lost if the secret is discovered "by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or
. . . reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and working backward
to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture." 416 U.S. at 476
(footnote omitted); see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
170 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1974) (patent law pro-
tects against both "copying" and "independent creation" of the patented subject matter);
supra note 107; cf. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (a patentee has the "right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention"). For a discussion of a patentee's "right of exclu-
sion," see R. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES § 4, at 5-8 (2d ed. 1943).
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interests are protected fully.171 Moreover, the ability to obtain
complete protection will stimulate competition with hardware de-
velopers, thereby "unleash[ing] important innovative talent" in the
software industry.17 2 Consequently, individual licensees of com-
puter programs will not be forced to create their own programs at
exorbitant expense.'7  Finally, a large developer, assured of total
postemployment protection, will be able to entrust its employees
with confidential information relating to potential technological
improvements, which in turn will contribute indirectly to the con-
tinued expansion of the software industry.7 4
CONCLUSION
Both courts and commentators have become embroiled in the
controversy over proprietary protection of computer programs. As
evidenced by the growing body of case law and literature, however,
a workable solution to this multi-faceted problem has yet to be
formulated. The production of computer programs nevertheless
has proceeded at a staggering rate. In view of this rapid expansion
of the software industry, this Note has attempted to identify the
gaps existing within the current forms of protection, and, more im-
portantly, to remedy such weaknesses. It is hoped that Congress
will act to facilitate the obtainment of maximum proprietary pro-
tection for computer programs. Indeed, until such remedial mea-
sures are effected by the legislature, the computer software indus-
try will remain exposed to potentially devastating financial loss.
Kevin F. Cavaliere
1 See Bender, supra note 4, at 244-46; cf. COMPUTER PROGRAMs & DATA BASES 15 (D.
Brooks & M. Keplinger co-chairmen 1981) ("[c]apital recovery and a profit ... are neces-
sary incentives" to growth in the computer industry (emphasis in original)).
172 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 217 n.42 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
amicus curiae brief in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)). For a brief discussion of the
various segments of the computer hardware industry, see D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 1.04.
173 See Raysman & Brown, Trade-Secret Law Protection of Software, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 4,
1982, at 1, col. 1. Extensive testing of a computer program is an essential stage in the pro-
gramming process. See D. BENDER, supra note 1, § 2.06[3]. This "debugging" phase proba-
bly accounts for at least "half the effort [expended] in software development." Id. at 2-141.
Because a program must be perfect in order for the computer to function as desired, see id.
§ 2.06[1], at 2-112.4, it is not surprising that program development expenses constitute
nearly "90% of total computer system costs," id. § 2.06[3], at 2-141 n.75.1 (Supp. 1981).
174 See Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (1960).
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